Indian millennials, fed on a post-Kargil diet, don’t want strategic restraint with Pakistan

To consolidate public support for its atrocities, Pakistan needs a scary neighbour. And Congress doesn’t conjure up existential threats like BJP does.

C. CHRISTINE FAIR Updated: 27 February, 2019 1:07 pm IST

Pakistan has long become accustomed to using its various terrorist organisations as tools of foreign policy to murder Indians with the impunity afforded by its nuclear umbrella. Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks developed a familiar rhythm since the overt nuclearisation of the subcontinent in May 1998.

The attack would take place and the international community would galvanise largely to press India to use restraint. The usual bromides would follow encouraging Pakistan to refrain from letting its territory be used by terrorist groups. Pakistan would succeed in the narrow sense that the jejune international media would usher forth false equivalencies by discussing in ahistorical generalities the “India-Pakistan dispute”. Pakistan would succeed in foisting Kashmir again into the news cycle. Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations would unfailingly make historically false claims with little resistance. Papers of record would predictably carry editorials calling for restraint and essentially rubbishing India’s right to self-defence while failing to hold Pakistan to account for using terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. Within a few weeks, the event would fall out of the news cycle. Indians would bury or cremate their dead, and the world would move on having escaped narrowly the next crisis in South Asia.


Also read: India has called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff again, but Modi cannot become complacent


Consequently, Pakistan has never really borne the cost of its behaviour and thus concluded that its policies of terror afforded the expected benefits at virtually no cost. While there is no “Naya Pakistan”, after 26 February 2019 it seems that there is a “Naya India.”

When Pakistan allegedly authorised the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) suicide attack on the CRPF convoy at Pulwama, it likely had several distal and proximate goals. First, in recent years, both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda India Subcontinent have sought to co-opt the Kashmir project. Pakistan surely wanted to re-exert control over its Kashmir project.

Second, Jaish-e-Mohammed along with the Afghan Taliban have been the principal rehabilitation vehicles through which Pakistan has been able to re-orient fighters from the Pakistani Taliban who share the Deobandi orientation of Jaish-e-Mohammed. (In fact, fighters previously associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed defected from the group to join the Pakistani Taliban.)

Third, Pakistan needed Narendra Modi’s electoral win for several reasons. Pakistan’s deep state has a lot of internal problems to manage. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) has shaken the deep state. Unlike the Baloch, whom it can murder with few consequences, Pashtuns are actually more over-represented in the army than the Punjabis. The deep state cannot murder its way out of the PTM crisis as it can in Balochistan. To consolidate public support for its atrocities, it needs a scary neighbour. Frankly speaking, the Congress doesn’t conjure up the existential threats like the BJP does.


Also read: India and Pakistan at the brink, foreign policy heads into the unknown in South Asia


Pakistan surely assumed that if there were to be a response to Pulwama, it would be perhaps like Uri. Pakistan also likely assumed that the United States would help shield it from the consequences of its outrages because President Donald Trump is depending upon Pakistan to provide him some modicum of a fig leaf to facilitate withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump has a fetishistic insistence upon fulfilling his campaign promises irrespective of how ill-informed, foolish or dangerous they may be.

But Pakistan got it all wrong. India did not respond as predicted. In fact, it dispatched twelve Mirage 2000s across the LoC and into Pakistani territory to drop ordinance on training facilities associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed in Balakot, which is in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. So far, there is no evidence that the Indian aircraft encountered Pakistani anti-air defences throughout the sorties despite Pakistani claims to the contrary.

Pakistan’s response has been telling. The ISPR, the official mouthpiece of the Pakistan military, claimed that Indian jets were ‘forced’ by Pakistan armed forces to drop their ordinance prematurely resulting in no damage. Nonetheless, it promised a befitting reply. This is probably a sign that Pakistan is seeking a path to de-escalation as it did after the Uri attack. The international community has also squarely blamed Pakistan for terror. Even China has not offered Pakistan words of encouragement for the simple reason that while China wants to encourage Pakistani adventurism, it does not want war. China has never offered Pakistan support during any of the wars it started with India and it won’t start now. The United States, however, has been curiously absent likely because of its negotiations with Pakistan and the Taliban.


Also read: Balakot is the first time one nuclear power has used air strikes on another’s territory


There is little doubt that Indians will no longer be satisfied with “strategic restraint” after incidents like Pulwama. Indian millennials have been raised in a post-Kargil media environment. Kargil was India’s first televised war. Prior to Kargil, few beyond north India cared about developments in far away Kashmir. The media coverage of the casualties, of bodies being returned to their homes for cremation, and nonstop reportage from Kashmir helped to create a national narrative about Pakistani predation. Indian millennials are fed up with Pakistan. A Rubicon has been crossed. While there is nothing Naya about Pakistan today, there is a Naya India.

C. Christine Fair is the author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War and In Their Own Words: Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.

This originally appeared in The Print on 27 February 2019 .

क्या पाकिस्तान मोदी की जीत के लिए जैश-ए-मोहम्मद का इस्तेमाल कर रहा है

BY सी. क्रिस्टीन फेयर ON 26/02/2019

पाकिस्तान के सांप्रदायिक एजेंडे के लिए नरेंद्र मोदी की एक और जीत से अच्छा कुछ नहीं हो सकता है. उनकी नीतियों ने पाकिस्तानियों को यह यक़ीन दिलाने का काम किया है कि भारत में मुस्लिम कभी भी सुरक्षित नहीं रह सकते हैं.

2001 के आखिरी दिनों में मसूद अज़हर ने कराची के एक तालिबान समर्थक मदरसा जामिया बिनौरी में अपने नवगठित संगठन जैश-ए-मोहम्मद की एक हंगामेदार बैठक बुलाई.

आईएसआई ने 24 दिसंबर, 1999 को एयर इंडिया की फ्लाइट 814 के अपहरण कांड के बाद इस समूह का गठन किया था. यह विमान एक ख़तरनाक सफ़र के बाद तालिबान नियंत्रित कांधार में उतरा था.

एक तनाव भरी बातचीत के दौर के बाद भारत की सरकार यात्रियों के बदले भारत की जेलों में बंद तीन आतंकवादियों : मुश्ताक़ अहमद ज़गरा, अहमर ओमर सईद शेख और मौलाना मसूद अज़हर को रिहा करने के लिए राज़ी हो गई.

रिहाई के बाद ये आतंकी पाकिस्तान के इंटर-सर्विस इंटेलीजेंस डायरक्टरेट (आईएसआई-डी) के संरक्षण में पाकिस्तान ले जाए गए.

जैश-ए-मोहम्मद का जन्म

31 जनवरी, 2000 को अज़हर ने एक नए देवबंदी आतंकी समूह जैश-ए-मोहम्मद के गठन का ऐलान किया. इसमें दूसरे कमजोर पड़ रहे देवबंदी समूहों, मसलन, हरकत-उल-अंसार, हरकत-उल-जिहाद-अल-इस्लामी आदि के सदस्यों को शामिल किया गया.

इसे देवबंदी अफगान तालिबान के साथ-साथ शियाओं, अहमदियों, बरेलवियों और गैर-मुस्लिम अल्पसंख्यकों की हत्या करने वाले देवबंदी आतंकवादी समूहों, मसलन, लश्कर-ए-झांगवी के साथ नजदीकी रिश्ता बनाए रखना था.

आईएसआई ने जल्द ही इस नवगठित समूह को कश्मीर के आतंक के मैदान में उतार दिया, जहां इसने पहली बार फिदायीन (आत्मघाती) धमाकों की शुरुआत की.

यह समूह 1 अक्टूबर, 2001 को जम्मू-कश्मीर की राज्य विधानसभा पर आत्मघाती कार हमले और 13 दिसंबर, 2011 को नई दिल्ली में भारत की संसद पर कार के जरिए किए गए आत्मघाती हमले के लिए कुख्यात हुआ.

जैश-ए-मोहम्मद का विभाजन और तहरीक-ए-तालिबान-ए-पाकिस्तान का उदय

लेकिन, इन कामयाबियों के बावजूद भी 2001 के आखिरी हिस्से में अज़हर को कराची के एक ऐसे मदरसे में विद्रोह का सामना करना पड़ा, जिसे वह अपना मानता था.

उसके ज्यादातर सदस्य इस बात से नाराज थे कि राष्ट्रपति और जनरल मुशर्रफ अफगानिस्तान में अमेरिकी आक्रमण में मदद कर रहे थे, जिसका मकसद उस देश के शरिया के एकमात्र देवबंदी अमीरात को तबाह करना था.

आईएसआई की मदद से जिसे स्थापित करने में तालिबान ने 1994 से अपना पसीना बहाया था. अज़हर के सहयोगी अपने पाकिस्तानी आकाओं को सबक सिखाना चाहते थे. मसूद इससे सहमत नहीं था. उसका कहना था कि समूह के मकसदों को पूरा करने के लिए पाकिस्तान की मदद जरूरी है.

लेकिन अज़हर की दलीलों को अनसुना कर दिया गया.  संगठन का अधिकांश हिस्सा टूट कर अलग हो गया और उसके पास सिर्फ समूह का नाम रह गया.

इसके ज्यादातर सदस्य जमात-उल-फुकरान के नाम के तले लामबंद हुए, जिसने क़ारी हसन के नेतृत्व में पाकिस्तान में क्रूर आत्मघाती हमलों की शुरुआत की.

यह उस गोलबंदी की पहली घटना थी, जिसके तहत आखिरकार देवबंदी आतंकी कमांडरों का एक कामचलाऊ किस्म का परिसंघ (फेडरेशन) तहरीक़-ए-तालिबान-ए-पाकिस्तान के झंडे तले अस्तित्व में आया, जिसका नेतृत्व बैतुल्ला महसूद कर रहा था.

आईएसआई का विश्वासपात्र बना जैश-ए-मोहम्मद

अज़हर ने इस घटनाक्रम की जानकारी आईएसआई को दी. इसने उसे खुफिया एजेंसी का दुलारा बना दिया. आईएसआई ने संसद पर हुए हमले का इस्तेमाल उसे थोड़े समय के लिए ‘गिरफ्तार करने’ के लिए किया.

वास्तव में हिरासत लेने का यह सारा खेल उसे सुरक्षा देने के मकसद से रचा गया. कई सालों तक आईएसआई ने मसूद अज़हर पर पैसा लगाया और दक्षिणी पंजाब के उसके बहावलपुर अड्डे में जैश-ए-मोहम्मद को फिर से खड़ा करने में उसकी मदद की.

2008 में इस लेखक को बहावलपुर पुलिस की एक उर्दू में लिखी गयी रिपोर्ट देखने को मिली, जो उसके बढ़ रहे साम्राज्य का दस्तावेज थी. वह खुलेआम यहां-वहां घूम कर रैलियां करता था, मज़हबी तकरीर देता था और यहां तक कि अपनी कई किताबों का प्रचार भी करता था.

2006 में उसने और उसके आईएसआई आकाओं ने तब अंतरराष्ट्रीय समुदाय को नाराज कर दिया, जब बरमिंघम में रहने वाले उसके साले राशिद राउफ ने ट्रांस अटलांटिक एयरलाइंस को उड़ाने के मकसद से उसमें लिक्विड बम बनाने की सामग्री को तस्करी करके लाने की कोशिश की.

इसमें हैरत की कोई बात नहीं कि राउफ पाकिस्तानी पुलिस की हिरासत से ‘भाग निकला’. बाद में उसने 2016 के पठानकोट हमले की साजिश रची.

2009 में अंतरराष्ट्रीय मीडिया को इस घटनाक्रम का अर्थ समझ में आया. आईएसआई द्वारा जैश-ए-मोहम्मद में पैसा लगाने का मकसद काफी सरल था : अज़हर जितने ज्यादा देवबंदी आतंकियों को अपने से जोड़ता, पाकिस्तान को निशाना बनानेवालों की संख्या उतनी कम होती.

ज़र्ब-ए-अज़ाब के बाद जैश आईएसआई का दाहिना हाथ बन गया

2014 तक अज़हर ने अपनी उपयोगिता साबित कर दी थी. कई महीनों की पूर्व-चेतावनियों के बाद जून, 2014 में पाकिस्तानी सेना ने पाकिस्तान तालिबान के खिलाफ अपने अव्यवस्थित ऑपरेशन ज़र्ब-ए-अज़ाब की शुरुआत की.

लेकिन ऐसा करने से पहले इसने एक बार फिर अपने बिगड़ैल सहयोगियों को ‘अच्छे आतंकवादी’ के खिताब से नवाज कर बचाने की भरसक कोशिश की. इसने इन्हें बच निकलने के दो विकल्प दिए.

पहला विकल्प अफगानिस्तान जाने का था, जहां वे तालिबान के साथ लड़ सकते थे. समय इसके लिए पूरी तरह से मुफीद था. उन्हें राष्ट्रपति ग़नी की जीत सुनिश्चित कराने के लिए अफगानिस्तान तालिबान के साथ मिलकर 2014 के राष्ट्रपति चुनाव में अवरोध पैदा करना था. डॉ. अब्दुल्ला अब्दुल्ला की जगह ग़नी पाकिस्तान की पसंद थे.

दूसरा विकल्प फिर से जैश-ए-मोहम्मद में शामिल होना और भारतीयों की हत्या करना था. ये दोनों ‘घर वापसी’ कार्यक्रम थे, जिनमें से किसी एक को वे चुन सकते थे. आनाकानी या ऐतराज करनेवालों को बख्शा नहीं जाना था.

2014 में पाकिस्तान में मेरे सूत्रों ने बताया कि वे नियंत्रण रेखा के साथ-साथ जैश की बड़ी लामबंदी देख रहे हैं. जनवरी, 2016 में जब जैश-ए-मोहम्मद ने पठानकोट के एयरबेस पर दुस्साहसी हमला किया : तब मुझे बस एक चीज को लेकर आश्चर्य हुआ था कि यह हमला मेरी उम्मीद से पहले हुआ था.

उस समय से जैश-ए-मोहम्मद आईएसआई के छद्म युद्ध में उसका दाहिना हाथ बन गया है.

एक तरफ लश्कर-ए-तैयबा (जो जमात-उद-दावा के नाम से काम करता है) देवबंदी आतंकवादियों के साथ ही इस्लामिक स्टेट- आईएस से लड़ाई में और इन देवबंदी आतंकियों को घरवापसी कार्यक्रमों में शामिल करने में मुब्तला था, वहीं जैश एक बार फिर समानांतर सरकार का एक अमूल्य रणनीतिक हथियार बन गया.

यह घटनाक्रम एक बार फिर इस सामान्य तथ्य को साबित करता है कि पाकिस्तान अपनी सीमाओं के बाहर जो भी करता है, उसमें एक बड़ी भूमिका उसकी अपनी मजबूरियों की होती हैं.

पुलावामा हमले के जरिए जैश ने दिखाई शक्ति

हाल का पुलवामा हमला इसी बात का एक और उदाहरण है. पाकिस्तान कश्मीर और भारत में दूसरी जगहों पर अपनी परियोजनाओं को लेकर चिंता की मुद्रा में है.

इस्लामिक स्टेट और अल-क़ायदा- इंडियन सबकॉन्टिनेंट ने पाकिस्तान को बदनाम करने और भारत में हिंदुत्व की राजनीति के उभार पर ढीली प्रतिक्रिया के लिए कश्मीरियों और दूसरे भारतीय मुस्लिमों की लानत-मलामत करने की कोशिश की है. गोरक्षा संबंधी हिंसा, राम मंदिर का पुनर्निर्माण करने की मांग आदि का मुस्लिम ‘लड़ाकों’ द्वारा मुंहतोड़ जवाब नहीं दिया गया है.

इस हमले में 19 साल के अंतराल के बाद फिदायीन हमले के लिए गाड़ी का इस्तेमाल किया गया. पहले आजमाए हुए एक सच्चे पाकिस्तानी पंजाबी की जगह एक स्थानीय कश्मीरी लड़के का चुनाव किया गया.

इसके अलावा हमले से पहले का एक ‘शहीद वीडियो’ भी है जिसमें उसने कश्मीरी और दूसरे भारतीय मुस्लिमों को जिहाद को आगे बढ़ाने के लिए कहा है.

इस तरह से इसे पाकिस्तान के नजरिए भी देखा जा सकता है:  कहा जा सकता है कि इसके जरिये पाकिस्तान ने खुद को खेल में आगे लाने और इस्लामिक स्टेट और अल-कायदा- इंडियन सबकॉन्टिनेंट की कोशेशों को कमजोर करने का काम किया है.

मोदी की जीत सुनिश्चित करना चाहता है पाकिस्तान

लेकिन, ये सारी बातें इस हमले के समय की व्याख्या नहीं करती हैं. मेरा मानना है कि इसका एक गहरा रिश्ता चुनावों से है.

पाकिस्तान को मालूम है कि प्रधानमंत्री मोदी की स्थिति इस बार उतनी मजबूत नहीं है जितनी पांच साल पहले थी और वे कठिन मुकाबले का सामना कर रहे हैं. इस बात में कोई संदेह नहीं है कि पाकिस्तान मोदी की एक और जीत पक्की करना चाहता है.

पाकिस्तान के सांप्रदायिक एजेंडे के लिए मोदी की एक और जीत से अच्छा और कुछ नहीं हो सकता है. उनकी नीतियों ने पाकिस्तान की परमाणु छतरी के तले के हत्यारे लड़ाकों में फिर से जान डाल दी है.

इसने पाकिस्तानियों को भी यह यकीन दिलाने का काम किया है कि भारत में मुस्लिम कभी भी सुरक्षित नहीं रह सकते हैं और इसने पाकिस्तानी सेना के इन दावों को मजबूती देने का काम किया है कि अगर नागरिक तरीकों पर निर्भर रहा जाए तो डरपोक नागरिक प्रशासन देश के राष्ट्रीय शत्रु से शांति करना चाहेगा.

पाकिस्तान ने मोदी को अपनी छाती ठोंकने का और साथ ही अपने समर्थन को बढ़ाने का भी एक एक सुनहरा दिया है, जिसमें हाल के महीनों में गिरावट आई थी. और हमले के दुस्साहस और बदला लेने की मांगों को देखते हुए मोदी के सामने पाकिस्तान द्वारा बिछाए गए इस जाल में फंसने से बचने का बहुत कम विकल्प है.

सी. क्रिस्टीन फेयर ‘इन देयर ओन वर्ड्स: अंडरस्टैंडिंग द लश्कर-ए-तैयबा’ (ओयूपी हर्स्ट: 2018) और फाइटिंग टू द एंड: द पाकिस्तान आर्मीज़ वे ऑफ वार (ओयूपी, 2014) की लेखक हैं. वे जॉर्जटाउन यूनिवर्सिटी में सिक्योरिटी स्टडीज प्रोग्राम में प्रोवोस्ट्स डिस्टिंगुइश्ड एसोसिएट प्रोफेसर हैं.

(यह लेखक के निजी विचार हैं. यह लेख मूल रूप से द क्विंट पर प्रकाशित हुआ था. लेखक की अनुमति से इसे अंग्रेज़ी से अनूदित कर प्रकाशित किया गया है.)

View: Pakistan’s Pulwama game plan

I wrote this piece for the Time of India on the plane leaving Delhi with Baby Mouse peering over my keyboard. This was written long before India’s airstrikes on Balakot. How is it possible to love Mouse as much I do given the relative brevity of time I spent with her? I miss her so much.

Pakistan has a problem. Pakistan is obsessed with changing maps in Kashmir. Pakistan, founded on the inherently communal, non-democratic and philosophically depraved “two nation theory”, believes that it is entitled to the entirety of Muslim-majority Kashmir. This claim is not based on any defensible procedure or proclamation. After all, neither the Indian Independence Act nor the terms of reference for Partition bestowed the territory upon Pakistan and indeed the former allowed the sovereign of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, to pick the dominion he would join. While he held out for independence, Pakistan dispatched invaders to seize it by force despite signing a stand-still agreement with Singh. Singh, unable to defend himself, requested Indian assistance. India agreed provided that he sign the instrument of accession to join India. Singh did so after which India dispatched forces to defend what became sovereign Indian territory. Since then, Pakistan has supported subterfuge in Kashmir, waged a proxy war since 1990 in addition to starting wars in 1965 and 1999. As time marched on and India continued to expand and modernise its defences, Pakistan’s aims have actually expanded. While seeking to wrestle all of Kashmir from India, it risibly also sees itself as the only power to retard India’s rise in the international system. But there are two big problems: it has an army that can start wars but cannot win them and it has nuclear weapons it cannot use because, while India will suffer tragic losses from Pakistani launches, Pakistan will cease to exist as a geopolitical entity after India responds in kind. Thus Pakistan has forged a distinctly Pakistan approach: nurture, support and deploy Islamist proxies to perpetrate a variety of outrages while using its nuclear weapons umbrella to deter Indian conventional responses and catalysing American intervention to pressure India to de-escalate. In this sense, Pakistan is an “international insurgent”. To be victorious, it does not have to defeat India, it need only demonstrate that India cannot defeat it and it does so by taking calculated risks like Pulwama.

Indians need to grapple with the sad truth that there will be no peace with the beast on the border irrespective of the particular inefficacious prime minister that is allowed to become the mayor of Islamabad: the army controls all policies that matter. In fact, Indians should grievously worry when Pakistani civilian leaders get too cosy with their Indian counterparts. In 1999, the Pakistan army was so outraged by the peace process that Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif forged that it launched the Kargil operation to sabotage it. Pakistan maintains a virtual petting zoo of terrorist proxy organisations that it can deploy in Kashmir or elsewhere in India, depending upon its particular aims. Pakistan can calibrate the violence in several ways. First, it can control the sensitivities of the theatre. Targets across the line of control in Kashmir – which it considers to be contested terrain – are the least provocative, followed by third-tier cities like Gurdaspur, followed by the most provocative targets like Delhi and Mumbai. Second, it can calibrate the target of the violence. In India targeting security forces seems to generate more outrage than purely civilian targets. Third, it can calibrate the lethality and mode.

At Pulwama, Pakistan’s choice was very specific. While the location was among the least provocative, the other details were clearly calculated to outrage. The group of choice was Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM). With Lashkar-e-Taiba deployed within Pakistan to counter Islamic State (IS) and other Deobandi militias murdering Pakistanis, JeM has become a principal vehicle to lure members of the Pakistani Taliban away from targeting the state and reorient them towards killing in India. After a hiatus of 19 years, it reintroduced the vehicle-borne suicide attack. More shocking yet, the suicide attacker, Adil Ahmad Dar (20), was a Kashmiri boy from the area who ostensibly went to Pakistan in the spring of 2018. JeM’s previous suicide bombers were not Kashmiri. Perhaps reflecting distrust that Dar would follow through, he made a pre-attack video announcing the attack. What explains the details of this particular attack? I suspect there are several motivations. First, both IS and al-Qaida in the Indian subcontinent have tried to draw Indian Muslims in Kashmir and elsewhere to their global causes while disparaging Pakistan-backed proxies. Both have mocked Indian Muslims for their alleged pusillanimity and failure to defend themselves against cow vigilante attacks, Hindutva ascendance, the resurgence of the demand to rebuild the Ram Mandir while supposedly also being uninterested in global Muslim concerns. This audacious attack – with a Kashmiri suicide bomber – is surely intended to regain the initiative and reassert Pakistan’s equities. Dar’s video also delivers a clarion message to northern Kashmiri Muslims: stop free-riding on the sacrifices of southern brothers. But it is also clearly intended to taunt Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Make no mistake: the interest of Pakistan’s deep state is best served by a Modi victory, which is now uncertain. Modi and his BJP seem to lend credence to the Pakistani deep state’s narratives about “Hindu India” and the safety of Muslims within it. Modi’s tenure also provides Pakistan’s various Islamist proxies with bountiful recruitment opportunities. By affording Modi to demonstrate his muscularity as he did in Uri – sensationalised in the recent eponymous film – Pakistan is giving Modi yet another opportunity to burnish his tough credentials vis-a-vis his notoriously tepid Congress competitors. And, given the tough election season ahead, Modi has no choice but to oblige. In the game of terrorism, Pakistan again proves itself to be the master.

This article originally appeared in The Economic Times on 26 February 2019.

Pak jihad’s nuclear umbrella

Punishing Pakistan for using terrorists as an elemental pillar of foreign policy will require not only India but the US as well to disencumber themselves from Pakistan’s nuclear coercion strategy.

C. Christine Fair

How is that Pakistan, a country with a shambolic economy and an army that has never won a war, can unremittingly orchestrate a deadly arpeggio of terror against India, a larger and generally better-armed country, without any significant adverse repercussions? Not only has Pakistan deliberately cultivated a menagerie of Islamist militant groups to harass India and Afghanistan since its inception as an independent state in 1947, many of the 9/11 conspirators stayed and enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan, while — perhaps most egregiously — US forces located and killed Osama bin Laden in the cantonment town of Abbottabad, less than one mile from the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy. Despite what was surely a vertiginous outrage to the United States, Pakistan escaped American wrath unscathed. Understanding how Pakistan has managed to use Islamist (and non-Islamist) proxies with breathtaking impunity requires one to grasp how the state developed its nuclear program precisely to shield it from reprisals for its proxy warfare strategy. In many ways, the history of Pakistan’s nuclear program and strategy of proxy warfare are inexorably tied together.

Not only does Pakistan’s nuclear program constrain India’s punitive options, it also keeps in check the options of the international community, which is also coerced by Pakistan’s fast expanding arsenal. Punishing Pakistan for using terrorists as an elemental pillar of foreign policy will require not only India but the United States as well to disencumber themselves from Pakistan’s nuclear coercion strategy. While not impossible, doing so is politically risky and few policy makers would be willing seriously to contemplate such options.Pakistan first grasped the utility of proxy actors in 1947, when it mobilized lashkars (or tribal militias) from Pakistan’s Pashtun areas to invade and seize Kashmir. From 1947 until the mid-1980s, Pakistan supported various kinds of low-level sabotage. Its efforts to spark a wider insurgency in the 1960s failed. Pakistan’s opportunity and capabilities to cultivate mayhem dramatically improved in the mid-1980s when Kashmiris in Indian-administered Kashmir began to rebel against New Delhi for an array of excesses including appalling electoral manipulation, malfeasance in managing Kashmiri political expectations, and state-sponsored violence against protestors. While the uprising began indigenously, by the early 1990s Pakistani Islamist militants had taken the helm from the local ethnic Kashmiri insurgents who had initiated this phase of political violence.

While Pakistan is renowned for its efforts to instigate Islamist insurgency and terrorism, it has also supported other militant movements in India. In the mid-1950s, Pakistan (as well as China) backed India’s Naga rebels in the northeast and, in the 1960s, Pakistan supported the Mizo rebels, also in India’s northeast. From the mid-1970s through the early-1990s, Pakistan also supported the Sikh insurgency in Punjab. Similarly, before and during the 1971 war in East Pakistan, the military relied upon Islamist militants to brutalize ethnic Bengalis in East Pakistan.To complement and enable its advances at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, Pakistan also innovated at the strategic level through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We now know that Pakistan had a crude device around 1983–4, if not earlier. Varun Sahni, describing Pakistan’s beliefs that its capabilities deterred crises with India in the 1980s, refers to the lingering but indecisive role of nuclear weapons as “nuclear overhang.” As Pakistan became increasingly confident of its nuclear capabilities, it was ever more emboldened to use its proxies in India, secure in the belief that India would be unable to punish Pakistan militarily. Consequently, Pakistan’s adventurism in India became bolder both through the use of state-sponsored proxies, but also through Pakistani security forces masquerading as militants in the 1999 Kargil War. Until the reciprocal nuclear tests by India and then Pakistan in May 1998, scholars used a term introduced by McGeorge Bundy, “existential deterrence,” to describe the deterrence that seemed to exist between India and Pakistan. Given the opacity and uncertainty surrounding the two countries’ programs, the mutual deterrence calculation of India and Pakistan did not rest on “relative capabilities and strategic doctrines, but on the shared realization that each side is nuclear-capable, and thus any outbreak of conflict might lead to a nuclear war.”

PAKISTAN’S NUCLEARIZED JIHAD

After the 1971 war, the Pakistan army was demoralized and held in low esteem by its citizens after effectively losing half the country. The people’s ire was compounded when they learned that Pakistan had been defeated despite unremitting state propaganda to the contrary. Z.A. Bhutto, whose Pakistan Peoples’ Party won the largest share of votes in West Pakistan in the 1970–1 elections, seized the reins of power. He had wanted to pursue a nuclear weapon as early as 1964; however, General Ayub rebuffed him then, arguing that developing a weapon would alienate Pakistan’s western allies and furthermore, if necessary, Pakistan could likely “buy a weapon off the shelf somewhere,” presumably from one of its Western allies. With his now unchecked authority, Bhutto began actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, hoping to curry favor with the army, diminish the chance of a coup, and consolidate the role of civilian decision-making in security and defense matters. Bhutto tasked A.Q. Khan with the ignominious task of stealing nuclear secrets for his country, and established two rival organizations in the hopes that their competition would hasten Pakistan’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. In his gasconading death-row autobiography, If I am Assassinated, Bhutto professed that the United States facilitated Zia’s coup for the sole purpose of denying Pakistan a nuclear future. (I found no evidence to support this claim in any secondary or primary source I have encountered.) According to Bhutto, when he came to power in December 1971, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was twenty years behind that of the Indians. However, by the time he was deposed, in 1977, Pakistan was on the threshold of possessing a nuclear capability. 

This is an excerpt from my current book, In Their Own Words: Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.  Note that I am donating all of my personal proceeds to Indian victims of terrorism. This excerpt originally appeared in The Tribune on 25 February 2019.

Here are Pakistan’s new strategies behind the Pulwama terror attack

Pulwama suicide attack, use of a Kashmiri attacker, and a pre-attack video is an attempt by Pakistan to reassert its equities over Kashmir dispute.

C. CHRISTINE FAIR Updated: 15 February, 2019 8:10 pm IST. This first appeared here: https://theprint.in/opinion/here-are-pakistans-new-strategies-behind-the-pulwama-terror-attack/193687/


On 14 February, Adil Ahmad Dar—a 20-year-old from Gundibagh village in Pulwama and former sawmill worker—mounted a vehicle-borne suicide attack on a CRPF convoy killing at least 38 jawans. Broadly speaking, Pakistan perpetrates these attacks in Kashmir and elsewhere in India because they help demonstrate that Islamabad has not been coerced into accepting the status quo.

However, this general expectation of Pakistani behaviour does not explain the particularly unique features of this attack. What are Pakistan’s strategic aims with this attack?


Also read: Kashmir suicide bomber a class 11 dropout who ‘trained 6 months for CRPF attack’


Calibrate the violence

The Pulwama attack reflects an interesting calibration of violence. There are three ways that Pakistan can escalate violence and the salience thereof. The first is the choice of geography. The least provocative venue is within Kashmir while the most provocative locations are the high-value urban targets like Delhi and Mumbai. In between are middle-tier cities beyond Kashmir such as Gurdaspur.

Second, is the choice of target. In India, the attacking of security forces seems to draw out more political ire and demands for revenge than when civilians are targeted. Third, is the kind of attack — suicide attacks perpetrated by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), special operations preferred by LeT or the more quotidian uses of explosives against convoys and other acts of sabotage.

This attack, in Kashmir, against security forces using an extremely violent attack measure is specifically calibrated to test Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s will with a fraught election in the background.

Suicide attacks and the videotape

The use of a suicide car bomb has not been used by JeM in some 19 years. And usually, Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide bombers are of Pakistani and Punjabi origin. But Adil Ahmad Dar was a youth from southern Kashmir. Politically, this is a major score given that few believe Jaish-e-Mohammed is a Kashmiri organisation.

However, this fact is likely tied to the video that he recorded before the attack. In the Palestinian suicide attacks, these videos served as a mechanism to ensure that the bomber will carry out the attack. In the event that he fails to do so, the organisation releases the video and the security forces capture the fellow or the organisation kills him—whichever happens first. This is the first time that such a video has been used, and I suspect that it likely reflects doubt that Dar would carry it out without this commitment video. However, having carried it out, the video will have enormous payback in terms of recruitment, fund raising and propaganda.

Islamic State and Al Qaeda

For some years, both the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda (AQ) have taunted Muslims in Kashmir and elsewhere in India for not defending themselves against cow lynchings, the political standing of Hindutva organisations, failure to insist upon the rebuilding of the Babri Masjid while discussion of rebuilding the Ram Mandir is ascendant. Both AQ and IS have chided Kashmiri Muslims for being parochial and restricting their vision to the Kashmir battlespace. Both have sought to cast Kashmir as a part of a larger civilisational battle in which India and other countries are waging war on Muslims. Their goal is to establish a caliphate through jihad. While both AQ and IS are competing with each other, they are also competitors for Pakistan’s deep state. Both AQ and IS mock the Pakistan-based and Pakistan-backed militant groups as lackeys of Islamabad.

I view this suicide attack, the use of a Kashmiri attacker, and the use of the pre-attack video as an attempt by Pakistan to reassert its equities over the Kashmir dispute specifically and the India problem more generally. This interpretation is buttressed by the statements that Adil Ahmad Dar made in the video. Like AQ and IS, he chided Muslims for their docility and challenged them to rise up. He also had a message for northern Kashmiri Muslims that they need to put skin in the game and stop free-riding off of the sacrifices of Muslims in Southern Kashmir.


Also read: How south Kashmir has turned into a hotbed of homegrown militants


Jaish-e-Mohammed to the front

With Lashkar-e-Taiba involved in Pakistan’s internal battles against ISIS and other groups that engage in takfiri violence (such as the Deobandi Pakistani Taliban and sectarian groups), Jaish-e-Mohammed is likely to be the most common Pakistani group active in India for the time being. The reason for this is strategic. When Pakistan waged war against the Pakistani Taliban, the ISI and the army offered two routes by which Pakistani Taliban could rehabilitate themselves: they could go back to Afghanistan and fight for the Taliban or rejoin Jaish-e-Mohammed and go fight India. Those who demurred would be killed.


Also read: Jaish Afghan war veteran in Kashmir to ‘avenge’ killing of Masood Azhar’s nephews


Both theatres are important for Pakistan today. With the United States withdrawing troops and handing Afghanistan back to Islamabad, there will be great interest in Pakistani Deobandi militants returning to Afghanistan to help the Taliban make more gains. At the same time, Jaish-e-Mohammed is a highly potent and loyal proxy with which to put pressure on India, even as India’s economy continues to grow and invests in the rebuilding of its security forces.

India’s options

India should consider a range of punitive measures ranging from sub-conventional operations against Pakistan’s terror-producing infrastructure as well as political measures such as backing away from the folly of the Kartarpur Corridor even though that is a difficult decision to undertake for domestic political reasons. Denuding Pakistan of its “most-favoured nation” status is way overdue. India can consider downgrading diplomatic ties, ousting the defence attache who is almost always the ISI station chief as well as others in the embassy suspected of facilitating terrorism. India should also immediately declare Pakistan a “state sponsor of terror”, while providing a path to rehabilitation should Pakistan ever bother. It is difficult to ask Washington DC to undertake a designation that India itself has not done.


Also read: Revoking Pakistan’s MFN status: Proportionate reply or Modi exploring diplomatic steps first?


US created this beast on the border

For the United States, President Donald Trump has used strong words against Pakistan and has even denied them monies that they have taken for granted. While Pakistan isn’t getting the cash, it got the prize — Afghanistan. It would be wishful thinking to expect this attack to educate Trump about the dangers of his policy preferences. However, one would like to think that Washington would consider declaring Pakistan to be a state sponsor of terror, applying sanctions to Pakistani military and civilians for whom there is enough intelligence of aiding terror. It should also press China to stop derailing efforts to list Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, Masood Azhar. Since the United States bares so much responsibility for creating the beast on the border, more than any other state, it has an obligation to slay the very beast it has nurtured.

The author of In Their Own Words: Understanding the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (OUP, Hurst: 2018) and Fighting to the End: the Pakistan Army’s Way of War (OUP, 2014).

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Lashkar members more educated than average Pakistani male, says scholar Christine Fair

In a wide-ranging discussion on her new book, Georgetown University professor Christine Fair shed light on some unknown aspects of terror organisation LeT.

SRIJAN SHUKLA Updated: 13 February, 2019 8:21 am IST

New Delhi: American scholar Christine Fair has revealed that Lashkar-e-Taiba members are actually “more educated than the average Pakistani male”, which goes against the general perception.

Fair was discussing her new book In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba at an event in New Delhi Tuesday, and shed light on many unknown and lesser-known aspects of the terror organisation.

A professor at Georgetown University, Fair is considered one of the most astute observers of Pakistan’s security affairs. Over the years, she has developed the reputation of a scholar who pulls no punches, and uses some of the most exciting empirical methods for her research.

Like her previous book on Pakistan’s Army, Fair’s research in the new book predominantly relies on the internal literature produced by LeT.

“I do not trust interviews at this stage of my career … everyone lies,” she said in response to a question from ThePrint, adding: “The good thing about using internal literature is that it’s undisputed, as the organisation itself produced it.”

Crux of Fair’s thesis

Fair’s book features a two-fold thesis: First, it presents LeT as an almost-establishmentarian non-state actor. She argues that over the years, ISI has supported and controlled LeT because of its unquestionable loyalty and its ability to conduct complex operations in India and Pakistan.

Second, Fair points to a major distinction between LeT and other Deobandi terrorist actors — that LeT is vehemently against conducting any violent jihad in Pakistan. Even when it comes to minority groups such as Shias and Ismailis, LeT believes in converting them but opposes using violence against them.

The second part of the thesis, on the domestic nature of LeT is one of the most astute insights, presenting an understudied and nuanced aspect of the notorious organisation.


Also read: Pakistan said to be using radical Islamist party to leash 26/11 mastermind Hafiz Saeed


The domestic realm of LeT

Fair told the gathering that two characteristics of the LeT stand out — it is a very dutiful organisation, and has a huge sociable aspect.

“Out of 10 mujahideen trained in combat, only one is actually sent for combat operations,” she said.

This further highlights two things.

First, that most LeT recruits are used for domestic propaganda purposes. Recounting an interesting anecdote, Fair remarked that while studying the biographies of various mujahideen, she found many of them complain to their mothers, ‘Why am I not picked for a mission?’

This highly domestic aspect of the LeT is what affects the education level of its members, Fair said.

Second, the organisation practices a procedure of extreme selectivity. This ensures that only the cream of the crop gets deployed. Perhaps, this explains the ability of the LeT to conduct extremely complex operations.

LeT is a Punjabi organisation, not a Kashmiri one

In another startling insight, Fair told the audience that most of the members of LeT come from 10 districts of Pakistani Punjab, and that there are hardly any Kashmiris in it.

When asked how does the LeT manage this contradiction of being a Punjabi organisation with a Kashmiri orientation, Fair had some intriguing answers.

She said that it is only externally that the LeT presents itself as a Kashmiri organisation. Everyone in Pakistan knows it is a Punjabi outfit.

Additionally, Partition is still a mobilising narrative among LeT members. While its operations are centred on Kashmir, LeT’s final aim is to destabilise the communal harmony of India.

Fair said that for most members, the greatest driving force is that “one day they will avenge the horrors of Partition”.


Also read: For the LeT, convincing mothers is one of the key steps to recruiting for Jihad


LeT is ISI’s dearest instrument

Fair said that certain conditions towards the end of the Soviet-Afghan War led to the co-option of the LeT by the ISI.

Back then, the LeT as an organisation was not interested in being a part of the then-prevalent militia infighting. Meanwhile, the ISI was not convinced about Kashmir’s indigenous group JKLF’s abilities, and it did not find Hizbul Mujahideen deadly enough. The LeT fighters were cheap to hire and reasonably decent in the ‘battlefield’.

A combination of these factors resulted in the adoption and development of the LeT as the most loyal ISI actor.

As an aside, Fair said the LeT’s hierarchical structure is extremely dependent on ISI support. In case the deep state in Pakistan retrenches, the LeT is likely to become very vulnerable.

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A New Way of Engaging Pakistan

After a terrorist associated with Jaish-e-Mohammad, JeM, drove a suicide vehicle into a bus transporting CRPF jawans in Pulwama (Kashmir), journalists have asked me what the US can do. I’ve written these suggestions countless times before. I’m re-upping this from 2016.

Since 9/11, the United States has furnished Pakistan with some $33 billion dollars in economics assistance, foreign military sales, and lucrative “reimbursements” under the coalition support funds (CSF) program. The United States has also provided Pakistan with access to U.S. strategic weapons systems, most notoriously the F-16 fighter aircraft. This multi-dimensional largesse has several motivations:

  • First, it was meant to provide Pakistan with positive inducements to facilitate U.S. operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and to support the U.S. efforts to degrade Islamist militants associated with Al Qaeda and its affiliates.
  • Second, (the widely abused) CSF funds were intended to reimburse Pakistan for the marginal costs associated with supporting the United States in its efforts at counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  • Third, the various aid programs—and most importantly US-support for various IMF programs—were intended to buttress the Pakistani government from financial shocks while it supported the U.S. regional and global efforts to retard Islamist militants’ capabilities. Pakistan is widely viewed as “too dangerous to fail” because of the toxic mix of the terrorist proxies it nurtures under its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella.
  • Fourth, the U.S. government has justified the provision of weapons systems under the base canard that they will enable Pakistan to fight the various militants ensconced in Pakistan.
  • Finally, these programs were intended to win Pakistanis’ hearts and minds and diminish their support for Islamist terror groups targeting the United States and afford the United States some degree of insight into and influence over Pakistan’s rapid nuclear proliferation and ceaseless raising of terrorist proxies.

At first blush each of these arguments makes sense—until you look at the data. Once you do, you realize that the US’s Pakistan policy is a washed-out approach to managing the country that has not made Pakistan more secure, has not advanced U.S. interests and, in fact, has encouraged the worst behavior from Pakistan.

It is time to develop coercive means to manage the international menace that is Pakistan.

What do the Facts Say?

If the overall logic of this largesse is to reward Pakistan for its support to U.S. efforts, proponents of this policy have much to answer for. In fact, since 2001, at least 3,515U.S. and coalition military personnel have been killed in Afghanistan and more than 20,000 US military personnel have been injured. Data on killed and injured U.S. and coalition civilians and defense contractors are nearly impossible to find, although the Department of Labor reports that 1,629 contractors have been killed in Afghanistan since September 2001 and the end of 2015. This in addition to tens of thousands of Afghan civilian and military personnel who have been killed or injured. Professor Neta Crawford at Boston University estimates that, between 2001 and December 2014, some 7,750 members of the Afghan National Army have been killed, as well as about 14,200 members of the Afghan police—in addition to the nearly 17,000 wounded Afghan police and military personnel as of 2014. These deaths and injuries are overwhelmingly not due to al Qaeda: rather, they are from Pakistan’s proxies, including the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, among others.

Economic support has not won over Pakistani hearts and minds. A majority of Pakistanis dislike the United StatesPakistan continues to provide overt support to an array of Islamist militant groups which are proscribed by the United States, such as the Haqqani Network, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba among numerous others, in addition to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has the world’s fastest growing nuclear weapons program, inclusive of tactical nuclear weapons. Despite Secretary of State John Kerry’s robust defense of Pakistan’s efforts against groups such as the Haqqani Network to justify the provision of another round of F-16s to Pakistan, others in the U.S. government robustly counter that Pakistan’s actions are far from adequate.  Pakistan launched the military farce Zarb-e-Azab in North Waziristan in the summer of 2014 only after the United States hounded it to do so and after U.S. Senator Carl Levin successfully put forward a June 2014 amendment to the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act. Under amended law, the Secretary of Defense cannot waive the certification requirements needed to release $300 million of the $900 million Coalition Support Funds to Pakistan, unless he can certify that “Pakistan has undertaken military operations in North Waziristan that have significantly disrupted the safe haven and freedom of movement of the Haqqani network.” Moreover,  Pakistan gave months of notice to the militants in North Waziristan and even relocated key Haqqani assets to safehouses before commencing the offensive in the first place.  Finally, Pakistan’s support for a veritable zoo of Islamist terrorists has deepened, not retrenched, with no end in sight despite the lucrative perquisites lavished upon the Pakistanis by the Americans.

Why does Pakistan do what it does? Simply put: terrorism under its nuclear umbrella is cheap and effective. It has an army that cannot win a war (except against its own civilians) and nuclear weapons it cannot use. Its Islamist terrorist proxies are the most effective tool it has to achieve its interests in Afghanistan and India. Outrageously, Pakistan has never born any cost for its behavior. Taken together, Pakistan has benefited from a simple moral hazard: the United States rewards Pakistan for the very behaviors it seeks to curb and the behaviors its perpetrates are self-rewarding. Pakistan faces no incentive to behave differently.

Ending Pakistan’s Impunity and Immunity

The United States needs to cease promulgating the fiction that Pakistan is an ally. What ally takes more than $33 billion from the United States while continuing to undermine key U.S. national security interests and while killing our men and women in and out of uniform, along with our allies in Afghanistan and elsewhere? The facts suggest that Pakistan behaves more like a strategic competitor or perhaps an enemy of the United States rather than a problematic ally.  

The most important reason why the United States has been reticent to “cut Pakistan off” is Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ever-expanding menageries of Islamist terrorists. Together, these “strategic assets” raise the specter of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, material, or know-how. But we should dispense with the ruse that our resources have enabled the United States to execute influence over this program. Worse yet, on the U.S. dime, Pakistan has invested in the very assets—nuclear weapons and terrorists—that disquiet Americans the most In other words, Pakistan is engaging in nuclear blackmail against the United States to ensure that the checks keep coming.  There have been recent efforts to offer Pakistan a path towards becoming a “mainstream nuclear power” should it wish to become a responsible nuclear state, but Pakistan has repudiated such offers with gusto. Pakistan’s rejecting such a path to normalcy should be a wakeup call to a somnolent Washington that resists new approaches to an old, dangerous problem.

It’s time to end Pakistan’s impunity. What does a new set of policies look like that could over time dissuade Pakistan from being a source of regional instability? There are three dimensions to this.

First, the United States needs to remove itself from the nuclear coercion loop.  Rather than embracing the impossible responsibility of policing the potential proliferators in Pakistan, the United States needs to remand responsibility for securing Pakistan’s nuclear materials to the Pakistani state itself. The United States should make it clear that Pakistan will be held responsible should non-state actors acquire its materials. The international community is in a good position to identify a putative Pakistani role because Pakistan’s “nuclear signature” is now well known. The United States should also make it clear that should the Pakistani state engage in first use of nuclear weapons on an adversary, that adversary will not be on its own in retaliating against Pakistan. The United States should consider undertaking countermeasures to subvert Pakistan’s program, as it did with Iran, and even consider imposing the kinds of sanctions that crippled Iran and brought it to the negotiating table. Pakistan is not, has not, and will not be a responsible nuclear state if left to its own devices. To believe otherwise is the reckless Beltway folly that brought us to current impasse in the first instance.

Second, Washington must cease incentivizing Pakistan to continue producing “good jihadi assets” while fighting “terrorists of the Pakistani state.” Unfortunately, Pakistan is engaging in simple asset banking. As long as Pakistan has terrorists to kill, the United States will pay exorbitant amounts to Pakistan to do so. If Pakistan were not a vast swamp of Islamist terrorism, the United States would be less concerned about the place. Instead of continuing to incentivize the security establishment to groom more terrorists, the United States should incentive them to abandon Islamist terrorists as tools of foreign policy.

How does Washington do this? As a preliminary matter, it should cease providing CSF funds. Pakistan should not be paid to do what sovereign states are supposed to do. Washington should also cease supplying Pakistan with strategic weapon systems. Instead, the United States should be willing to provide a narrow set of platforms which have proven utility in counterterror and counter-insurgency operations.  None of these platforms should have significant value in fighting India. The United States should also offer Pakistan military training in these areas, as well other areas that fit squarely within the rubric of domestic security: natural disaster relief, for example. The United States should remain willing to provide police training and counterinsurgency training to Pakistan’s security forces and other forms of assistance to Pakistan’s shambolic justice system should Pakistan permit the United States to so and should the United States be able to provide meaningful assistance to these organizations.

A key part of this change of incentives is that the United States should deliver a very clear statement that it will declare Pakistan to be a state sponsor of terror because it is. Such a declaration will impose sweeping and devastating sanctions against Pakistan.  To pre-empt such an outcome, the United States should provide a time-line of concrete steps that the Pakistan must take against the various militant groups it now supports. The first such step is ceasing active support for these groups, constricting their space for operations and recruitment; ultimately, we should demand the elimination of the remnants. Even if Pakistan were willing to do so, this will be long-term project akin to any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.  Pakistan has trained tens of thousands of militants, if not more. However, there should be no economic support to Pakistan for these efforts as long as it continues to actively raise, nurture, support and deploy so-called jihadis for state goals.

If Pakistan does not play ball, Washington must develop negative inducements and the concomitant political will to use them. What do these look like in addition to declaring the country to be a state sponsor of terrorism? The United States needs to be willing to target specific individuals who are providing material support to terrorist groups and individuals. This means international prosecution, Department of Treasury designation and seizure of accounts, and visa denials. Pakistan’s civilian and military personalities enjoy coming to the United States for medical treatment, holidays and for educating their children. These privileges should be sharply curbed for any person found to be supporting terrorist groups The United States should work with its allies to ensure that  its other partners follow suit. If China does not wish to cooperate, that is literally China’s problem. The United States should be less concerned about “lost access and influence” than about coercing Pakistan to abandon the  most dangerous policies that it currently pursues with American subsidies.

Third, even it does none of the above, the United States can curb Pakistan’s appetite for terrorist misadventures by depriving it of the principle benefit it derives: international attention to its pet cause, Kashmir. Recent administration statements that reiterate support for India and Pakistan to achieve “peaceful resolution of outstanding issues, including Kashmir” reward Pakistan for its malfeasance while treating India as an equal party to the crime. India is, in fact, a victim of Pakistani terrorism.

Not only does this language gratuitously reward Pakistan for its use of terrorism in Kashmir, it is historically ill-informed and dangerously misguided. Despite Pakistan’s vocal assertions that it has legitimate claims to Kashmir, the facts bely Pakistan’s narrative. First, the Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not allocate Kashmir to Pakistan; rather allowed the princely state to select the dominion of its choice. Second, Pakistan started the first war of Kashmir by dispatching militants who enjoyed various levels of state support in an effort to seize Kashmir by force, despite having signed a standstill agreement which bound it to not undertake a military invasion.  As a consequence of Pakistan’s invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh signed an instrument of accession to India in exchange for military assistance. Thus, all of Kashmir, including that portion currently administered by Pakistan and that portion “ceded” to China in 1963, are lawful parts of India. Moreover, India is the status-quo power on Kashmir notwithstanding some Hindu nationalists’ efforts to revivify demands for all of Kashmir under the rubric of “Akhand Bharat,” whereas Pakistan is the revisionist state seeking territorial changes through the use of military force (1947-48, 1965, 1999) and through terrorist proxies (1947-present). Not only does Pakistan lack any defensible equities in Kashmir, India has been the victim of Pakistan’s reliance upon Islamist militant proxies in Kashmir literally since 1947.

U.S. statements of this type also reveal an astonishing ignorance about the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions pertaining to Kashmir. While Pakistan is fond of demanding implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 47 (1948), it obfuscates what the resolution actually says. It first required Pakistan to “secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purposes of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State.” When the Pakistani withdrawal has occurred and that the “arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective,” India was to begin withdrawing its forces from Jammu to a “minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order.”  Finally, when India had followed through, India was to ensure that a free and fair plebiscite would be carried out. However, despite Pakistan’s adamancy that this resolution be executed, Pakistan only focuses upon the plebiscite, rather than the first step which Pakistan was supposed to undertake as a precondition to the subsequent actions to be undertaken by India.  Needless to say, it is India’s position that the Simla Agreement of 1972, which formally concluded the 1971 war with Pakistan, obviates UNSCR 47 and other related resolutions. In that Agreement, both India and Pakistan agreed to pursue the “peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches.”

When the United States acknowledges Kashmir as a disputed area, it either demonstrates an enormous historical ignorance of the issues or evidences an effort to placate Pakistan at the costs of facts, law and history. Worse yet, it rewards Pakistan for its continued use of terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere in India.

Consistent with historical facts, the United States should refuse to interject any mention of Kashmir in its various statements with and about Pakistan. Equally, it should abjure making any statements encouraging India to engage with Pakistan on the subject. Pakistan craves such language because it legitimizes Pakistan’s contention that it is seeking peace from India, which obstructs its efforts. While it would be preferable if the United States adopted strong language placing the onus on the conflict firmly upon Pakistan, a middle ground may simply be omitting such language altogether. The Pakistanis are very sensitive to such omissions and will understand the intent that such an omission conveys. Such signaling would also advance U.S. interests in discouraging Pakistani terrorism in some measure by depriving Pakistan of this much sought-after benefit.

Along similar lines, when Pakistan-based terrorist organizations attack India, the United States should abandon its usual practice of encouraging India publicly to observe restraint and offering the usual bromidic calls for the both sides to continue dialogue.  Such language imposes a false equivalence on India, the victim, and Pakistan, the victimizer. Most importantly, such language rewards Pakistan for using terrorism, and one of the reasons why Pakistan does so is to continue focusing international attention upon the area and incentivizing the international community to continue identifying Kashmir as “the most dangerous place on earth.” Instead, the United States should consider encouraging Pakistan publicly to take action against the militant groups in question and to cooperate with Indian and international law enforcement agencies to bring the terrorists to justice. This is a far cry from what the United States should do to punish Pakistan for continuing to use Islamist terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, but it may be something that the current or next administration would consider.

The United States inter-agency should have a serious conversation about its official position on the Kashmir “dispute.” I would encourage the inter-agency to officially adopt support for converting the Line of Control into the international boundary. After all, such a conversion requires India to forego its claims on Pakistan-administered Kashmir while allowing Pakistan to retain that which it currently controls without legal sanction.

The Counter Arguments?

There are several counter-argument to what I am proposing here, all of which are flawed.  First, there are those who note that the aide cut-off in 1990 failed to prevent Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons in 1998 and even enabled the rise of the Taliban. This is bad history. Pakistan developed a crude nuclear weapon by 1984. Moreover, nothing in the cut-off required the United States to outsource its Afghanistan policies to Pakistan.

Second, Pakistan is not likely to fail. In fact, Pakistan is one of the most stable instabilities. It survived the 1971 war, in which it lost half of its population and nearly half of its terrain. It has survived calamitous natural disasters and it has managed to survive the avarice and mendacity of its own leadership.

Third, there are those who say Pakistan will not continue fighting the terrorists unless the United States pays it to do so. This too is likely wrong. The terrorists Pakistan is killing are Pakistan’s terrorists. Pakistan will continue fighting them for reasons of its own. And it doesn’t fight the people we consider terrorists, except to the extent they are also Pakistan’s terrorists. It continues to nurture a raft of militants that the United States views as foes.

Finally, there are those who are risk averse. They would rather maintain the status quo with the full knowledge that the United States is not getting value for its money than risk a new approach. These risk averse persons are seriously mistaken. The current U.S. policy has made Pakistan more dangerous to itself, to its neighbors, and to U.S. interests principally by politically rewarding and bankrolling Pakistan’s twinned expansion of its nuclear and jihadi arsenals. It’s time this madness stopped. Even if the withdrawal of U.S. resources doesn’t change Pakistan’s behavior, at least the United States would not be subsidizing the undermining of its own most delicate policies.

This originally appeared in Lawfare on 11 April 2016.




Denying Pakistan the Dividends of Terror

After a terrorist associated with Jaish-e-Mohammad, JeM, drove a suicide vehicle into a bus transporting CRPF jawans in Pulwama (Kashmir), journalists have asked me what the US can do. I’ve written these suggestions countless times before. I’m re-upping this from 2016.

Neither diplomatic isolation nor strategic restraint will bring Islamabad out of the jihad cycle

Since the earliest months of its existence, Pakistan has sought to seize Kashmir through the use of state proxies. That first dalliance with so-called ‘irregulars’ as tools of statecraft led to the first war between India and Pakistan in 1947-48. In its endless zeal to appropriate Kashmir through warfare, it again started—and lost—wars in 1965 and 1999. Since 1989 it has cultivated a proxy war, of varying intensity over time, in Kashmir. The Pakistan army’s untiring enthusiasm for backing terrorist groups that enthusiastically kill Kashmiris for the army’s aims demonstrates that Pakistan has little regard for Kashmiris themselves whose land it covets.

In recent decades, some of Pakistan’s less-disciplined proxies have turned their weapons against the state and its polity. This blowback has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of ordinary Pakistanis, many of whom are children. Yet despite the outcry in the aftermath of the bombing of the army school in Peshawar and talk of Pakistan’s ‘strategic shift’, Pakistan remains undeterred—and even evermore resolute—in its addiction to so-called ‘jihad’ to achieve its foreign policy objectives in India, as well as Afghanistan.

Why does the Pakistan army continue to rely upon a tool that has brought great harm and international calumny to the Pakistani state? The answer is as simple as it is cruel: Pakistan’s army uses terrorism, under the safety of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella, because it works, is cost-effective, and offers putatively plausible deniability because Pakistan’s own security forces are not engaged in the butchery. More appalling yet, Pakistan’s deep state is indifferent to the deaths of its citizens as long as some of these groups are still willing to do its malevolent bidding in India and Afghanistan.

The most recent outrage at Uri was surely an attempt by Pakistan’s army to punish India for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s widely-praised Independence Day speech in which he raised the khakis’ hackles by dilating upon Pakistan’s extensive human rights violations in Balochistan. Modi’s efforts to focus domestic and global attention to Pakistan’s sinister malfeasance in Balochistan was likely a riposte to Pakistan’s instigation, and subsequent exploitation, of the current crisis in Kashmir precipitated by the killing of a known Pakistan-backed terrorist commander, Burhan Wani. Wani was associated with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, which the United States, European Union and India have designated as a terrorist organisation. Pakistan’s civilian-led government decried his killing by Indian security forces as ‘deplorable and condemnable’ in yet another spectacle of Pakistan’s wantonly indefatigable support of terrorism.

We have seen Pakistan rejoin words with carnage before: in the summer of 2015, Pakistan responded to the Modi Government’s bluster after the so-called Myanmar raid with the attack on Gurdaspur, Punjab. Other attacks were to follow including those on Udhampur and the Air Force base in Pathankot. Pakistan called India’s bluff then as now.

In response to the recent outrage at Uri, India’s leadership announced that it planned to diplomatically isolate Pakistan in an effort to pressure it to relent in its deployment of terrorists to secure the army’s foreign policy objectives. Unfortunately, this gambit is doomed to fail if history offers any useful heuristics. Between 1990 and September 2001, Pakistan was thoroughly isolated and smothered with multiple layers of sanctions related to its nuclear weapons programme as well as General Musharraf’s 1999 coup. These penalties were in addition to entity-specific sanctions pertaining to the violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime perpetrated by Pakistan and China. However, it was during this precise period that Pakistan was running a sanguinary civil war in Afghanistan, winding down its extensive support of Sikh terrorists in Indian Punjab, while simultaneously widening and deepening its involvement in appropriating the previously indigenous uprising in Kashmir. If Pakistan could simultaneously engage in such profound and diverse sub-conventional activities during a period of deep isolation, what makes New Delhi think that its proposed efforts to diplomatically isolate Pakistan today will coerce Pakistan to abjure its well-honed use of Islamist terrorism?

Unfortunately, the only way to make Pakistan cease its trafficking in death for political aims is to significantly alter Rawalpindi’s cost-benefit analysis. There are two components to this strategy: first, reducing the benefits it enjoys from the same, and second, raising the costs of terrorism.

In response to the outrage in Uri, India’s leadership announced that it planned to diplomatically isolate Pakistan. Unfortunately, this gambit is doomed to fail if history offers any useful heuristics

To reduce the benefits that accrue from the strategy, one must understand what those benefits Pakistan derives from attacks on India are. After any such attack, peace-mongers in India and beyond renew their bleating for ‘dialogue’. One engages in dialogue with a party that wants peace. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that Pakistan’s deep state wants peace. One should be very clear: Pakistan’s deep state is the only state that matters in this game. Any civilian overture towards India has been consistently undermined by the deep state because peace is literally a threat to the deep state’s deeper interests. If there were ever to be some modicum of peace, how can the army justify running and ruining the state per its own whim? It could not.

Indians and the rest of the world must understand that the Pakistan army will always be a spoiler of even the most well-intended peace overture from Pakistan’s beleaguered and besieged civilians. Once one realises this, one must confront the very real question of the ultimate aim of this dialogue because it cannot produce peace. Worse, any dialogue with Pakistan on ‘outstanding disputes’ rewards Pakistan by reaffirming the deep state’s contention to its yoked citizens and wearied international community that there is, in fact, a territorial dispute.

In fact, there is no territorial dispute in which Pakistan has any defensible equities. Neither the Indian Independence Act of 1947 nor the Radcliffe Boundary Commission accord Pakistan any claim to Kashmir. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 averred that the sovereigns of princely states could choose which state to join. As is well-known, Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh only acceded to India after Pakistan dispatched irregular forces to seize the terrain by force. In fact, Pakistan makes this claim based upon the Two Nation Theory, its communally bigoted founding ideology.

Pakistan will not change course until it faces serious political, diplomatic and military costs for its malfeasance. Politically and diplomatically, India may consider putting its partners to the test by resisting international pressure to engage Pakistan for the sake of optics. The US State Department’s statement on Uri mercifully avoids the language of ‘dialogue’ which plagued past crises and rewarded Pakistan by equating the perpetrator (Pakistan) with the victim (India). President Obama, at the United Nations General Assembly, asked those nations engaged in ‘proxy wars’ to end them. But he stopped short of naming Pakistan. While American official demurrals from mentioning Pakistan as the likely culprit may have been a prudent act in the absence of more facts, as evidence emerges, the United States should specifically name and shame Pakistan. India would also be behooved to abandon its efforts to raise the issue of Balochistan— no matter how just the move is—because it gives the impression that India and Pakistan are in a tit-for-tat diplomatic scrimmage at the United Nations. This undermines India’s credibility on this issue and undermines India’s moral high ground on the specific issues of Pakistan’s malfeasance in India. India likely doesn’t want to set a precedent of commenting upon a neighbour’s internal security challenges when its neighbours may reciprocate the favour.

Instead, India would be better served by fixing a laser-like focus upon Pakistan’s support for terrorist organisations in international fora, and galvanising the emergence of an international consensus in support of India’s position. China will likely rebuff any move to designate Pakistan’s beloved proxies because China is Pakistan’s surrogate at the United Nations Security Council. But even China is growing increasingly languorous with taking the heat for Pakistan’s imprudence. Continued pressure at the United Nations will force China to either continue defending the indefensible or relent to new designations.

Short of war, India has other options. First, India may consider declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. Why should the US and the EU monopolise the power to name and shame? Arguably if India wants other capitals to do this, it should lead by example. Delhi can revoke Pakistan’s ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status. While the financial penalty will be relatively small, the diplomatic significance may be notable. India can downgrade the status of the Pakistan High Commission and its own embassy in Islamabad. It can oust the ambassador as well as the ISI chief in Delhi, who is the defence attaché. While these characters will be replaced by other cogs, the signal will be sent.

The Pakistan army will always be a spoiler of even the most well-intended peace overture from Pakistan’s beleaguered and besieged civilians

There has been discussion of reneging from the Indus Water Treaty. While this sounds like an act short of declaring war, in fact, it will be an opening salvo in a likely conflict as this will threaten Pakistan’s core interest: the survival of the state itself. Moreover, India will likely draw international opprobrium as such a move will harm ordinary Pakistanis as well as the deep state. Instead India may evaluate options on the lower end of the conflict spectrum. There is surprisingly little public debate about sub- conventional deterrence. After all, if nuclear weapons provide Pakistan with immunity for its follies, don’t India’s own nuclear weapons afford India the same impunity? There are numerous fault lines that India could exploit if it were willing to forgo its aversion to such actions.

Limited air strikes from Indian airspace on Pakistani camps with precision-guided munitions may be an option. However, Pakistan has competent air defences and may well shoot down Indian aircraft flying sorties in its own airspace. India will need to be prepared for escalation. India should make it clear to the US and the international community that its press-ganging is best served by pressing Pakistan to accept loss of terrorist camps as a price of terrorism. To date, Pakistan has relied upon the international community pressing India to de-escalate. This only further shields Pakistan from the consequences of its own actions. This equation must change if the international community wants less instability in the region.

Over the longer run, India may be well-served by dusting off some variant of ‘Cold Start’. Pakistan can brandish threats to use its battlefield nuclear weapons. However, simple math reveals that Pakistan’s threats are hollow. India will survive any nuclear exchange despite grievous loss of life and damage to key cities. Pakistan will cease to exist as a political entity in its current form. Moreover, India is not likely to be left responding to Pakistan’s first use on its own.

Foes of developing more offensive means to compel Pakistan to kick the terrorist habit argue that it’s a good time to be an Indian. Economic growth has been solid even when the rest of the world was suffering a severe retraction. This growth can continue if India can avoid a protracted conflict with Pakistan. This policy of strategic restraint assumes that some number of Indians will die. And this may well be a reasonable, if calculatedly cruel, trade off. However, if the intent is to coerce Pakistan to exit the jihad game, neither diplomatic isolation nor strategic restraint will fit the bill.

The international community should stand by India in any decision it makes. After all, it—particularly the US—has contributed to making Pakistan the menace it is.

This originally appeared in Open on 23 September 2016.

Strategies for Pulwama-like attacks trace back to ISI HQ: Christine Fair

In the wake of the Pulwama terrorist attack, India needs a discussion about what is in its best interest — should it continue with its strategy of restraint or change its behaviour — says C Christine Fair, author of In Their Own Words: Understanding Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. Fair tells Bhaswar Kumar in an interview that terrorist attacks like Pulwama will continue because this is the only way Pakistan can show India that it is not defeated, no matter how powerful India becomes. Edited excerpts:

Do you think successive Indian governments’ strategic thinking has been to bide time and avoid a large confrontation with Pakistan in the interest of economic growth?

Indian governments do not say so. Unlike the US, India does not have a written National Security Strategy (NSS). Each American President has to issue an NSS and this is the standard by which informed citizens can monitor the budget and other applications of national powers. Few countries have NSS documents. These are helpful documents, as they effect a public debate and provide a road map for the elected government.

So, though one could not be certain, one could infer a general avoidance of confrontation from the Indian government’s behaviour. And, it seems to be a constant since the post-Kargil time.

India understands that if it can keep focusing on its economy, it can continue increasing its defence allocation in real terms, with its overall economy continuing to grow. That will allow India to outgrow the Pakistan threat.

For its part, Pakistan understands that it has an army that cannot win the wars that it starts, and nuclear weapons that it cannot use, so it must demonstrate that India’s hegemonic goals are not unchallenged. This means Pakistan must attack India through proxy actors under its nuclear umbrella, just to demonstrate that India has not defeated it or forced it into accepting the status quo.

In other words, these terrorist attacks will continue because it is the only way Pakistan can show India it does not stand defeated, no matter how powerful India becomes.

As for India, there is some value in its strategy: More people die of roads accidents in a day than those from terror in a year. But, car accidents cannot be a political issue; terror attacks can be.

But, with India’s people and polity growing less and less tolerant of terrorist attacks, how long can such a strategy remain viable?

This, I cannot say. But I agree with your general observation. Indians have been exceedingly tolerant in ways that Americans have not been. It also seems that Indians can tolerate attacks on civilians more than they can on their armed forces. When Pakistani proxies attack the armed forces, there is a sustained outrage and calls for a response are more forceful.

What would possibly be the consequence if India stuck to its earlier strategic behaviour?

There is nothing inherently wrong in that strategy. However, by not imposing costs upon Pakistan for its actions, India is doing nothing to compel Pakistan to stop.

India, like all democracies, needs a discussion about what is in its best interest — continuing with a strategic restraint, tolerating terrorist attacks in favour of growth, or attempting to deliver a final solution to the Pakistan problem. That latter would require a decisive defeat of Pakistan, like in 1971, and dismantling of its army. Is it even possible given the constraints of a short war and nuclear weapons? I doubt.

Is there a middle way — perhaps a strategic restraint, avoiding any big confrontation, but also incorporating elements of sub-conventional deterrence? That might be optimal; it would preserve the economic utility of a strategic restraint and also punish Pakistan for its misdeeds.

India does need to respond. And the response that best satisfies the democratic demand for retaliation while diminishing Pakistan’s second-mover advantage would involve air strikes using stand-off weapons from India’s side of the line of control.

That might require some form of limited conflict. How does India strike a balance and still achieve a meaningful outcome?

This is difficult to answer. But, Kargil taught both India and Pakistan that a limited war is possible. Essentially, Kargil motivated the Indian defence establishment to develop a limited-war doctrine, which evolved into the debated notion of ‘Cold Start’. But, the key here is a decisive victory within the constraints of a short war. I’m not sure if India has this capability.

India also seems to have a terrible habit of boasting of capabilities it does not actually possess. Pakistan takes these boasts at face value and begins developing counter-measures. So, by the time India has an operational ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, Pakistan has already begun fielding battle-field nuclear weapons to vitiate a ‘Cold Start’. I really wish India learnt secrecy and valued it.

Did India’s surgical strikes after the Uri attack indicate a slight, if any, shift in its strategic thought — perhaps towards not linking economic growth and confronting Pakistan?

No. Previous governments had also conducted surgical strikes. They just didn’t go public with them, much less inspire a Bollywood film with possible electoral benefits.

Given the high level of casualty, and its timing, could the Pulwama attack have been approved at the level of a major or mid-level military officers attached to these groups? Or does the chain of command go all the way to the top?

Such attacks go back to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters. This was an attack with a strategic value. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) is not a freelancer. This was planned and resourced in advance. It is not easy to learn to drive a suicide vehicle. And, the vehicle was assembled locally. There is much to be discovered about this attack. But, this goes all the way to the top.

ALSO READ: A self-goal

You earlier described Pathankot and Gurdaspur attacks as carefully calibrated probes to test India’s red lines. Does Pulwama also fall in that category?

Let me preface my argument by saying that I have no interest in India’s domestic politics, or in who does or does not become the prime minister. This particular attack might have had India’s elections in mind. Prime Minister Narendra Modi galvanises Pakistanis against India far more effectively than any other political party or leader. Pakistan’s deep state makes ready use of this to argue for the salience of the ‘Two Nation Theory’. And it also motivates the recruitment and fundraising for Pakistan’s myriad terrorist groups. Thus, Pakistan has an incentive to do things that might influence the coming elections.

If the previous attacks were probes to gauge the government’s strategy or will, what were they for?

Pakistan’s army is understood as an ‘international insurgent’. To win, it need not defeat India. Rather, it only needs to demonstrate that India has not imposed its will upon it. In contrast, to defeat Pakistan, India must indeed impose its will upon it.

The best way for Pakistan to demonstrate that it has not been coerced by India is to use proxy elements against India, because this has the advantage of denial and deception, without blunting lethality.

What to expect next with regard to Pakistan’s strategy?

Pakistan has an array of proxies that it can use. At one level, Pakistan engages in balancing them off of each other. Currently, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) is engaged in domestic activities. JeM, along with the Afghan Taliban, is an important syphon with which to remobilise the Pakistan Taliban as “good terrorists” again. If Pakistan can mobilise Deobandi militants to fight in Afghanistan or India again, there are fewer terrorising Pakistan.

In the near term, I expect to see more of JeM than LeT. Also LeT does not do suicide attacks. When LeT conducts its fidayeen assaults, the goal is to kill only Indians. If an operative can live to fight another day, that is fine. The highest imperative is not getting caught. In contrast, JeM — like the Taliban and other Deobandi groups — does actual suicide attacks, where the primary goal is to die. Suicide attacks captivate and terrorise citizens in ways that LeT’s high-risk operations tend not to.

Also, Pakistan’s proxies deliver nearly the same warfighting quality at a lower price. A JeM or LeT fighter is about as qualified as someone between the rank of a junior commissioned officer and someone who can qualify as a candidate in Pakistan’s military academy. Their training is devised by the army but is shorter. However, unlike regular soldiers, these proxies are trained to die in the operation, and there is no retirement or family benefit to be given. In contrast, India sustains a huge, immobile force comprising multiple institutions — many not well protected and requiring inordinate resources to field and sustain.

Will any diplomatic measure to “isolate Pakistan” work? Or will the international community impose equivalence on Pakistan and India, and call on New Delhi to talk to Islamabad?

The US abandoned this ‘false equivalence’ long ago. In several past years, the US has demurred from its usual bromidic calls for “both sides to resolve all outstanding disputes through dialogue, etc”. Now, it is clear that Pakistan is responsible for the attacks and reiterates India’s right of self-defence. All of this is good news. But I doubt Washington will actually do more, given President Donald Trump’s need for Pakistan to give him a less embarrassing withdrawal from Afghanistan.


The interviewee is a Provost’s distinguished associate professor in the Peace and Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service. She earlier served as a political officer to the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan in Kabul.

This originally appeared on 20 February 2019 in the Business Standard.

Trump Throws Afghans Under the Bus

C Christine Fair 

For nine years, Washington has pursued talks with the Afghan Taliban to end a war that began on October 7, 2001. This week, Zalmay Khalilzad, Donald Trump’s special envoy for ending the war, told The New York Times that after six days of talks in Qatar, American negotiators and Taliban agreed on “a draft of the framework” for some future accord.

Washington is considering a complete withdrawal of US-led forces in exchange for the Taliban committing to direct talks with Afghan government for a ceasefire. The New York Times anointed the framework as the “biggest tangible step towards ending a war that has cost tens of thousands of lives and profoundly changed American foreign policy”. It seems as if many observers, in rank cupidity, are mistaking a framework for a US exit with a deal to bring to peace in Afghanistan while believing the Taliban can or will fulfill their promises.

According to Khalilzad, the Taliban committed to preventing Afghanistan from being a base for terrorists. A Taliban official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the BBC that both sides agreed to form separate working groups on: a time frame for the withdrawal of US-led forces and a commitment from the Taliban to prevent al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base.

While Washington wants the Taliban to negotiate a ceasefire with the Afghan government directly, they are disinclined to do so because they dismiss the government as an American puppet. The afore-noted Taliban official said they are conferring with their leadership the demand to negotiate a ceasefire with Kabul. He, however, did not believe the deal would depend on either direct negotiations or the ceasefire.

Zalmay Khalilzad at the Afghan peace talks. Twitter @US4AfghanPeace

Zalmay Khalilzad at the Afghan peace talks. Twitter @US4AfghanPeace

It’s difficult to tell where American credulity ends and mendacity begins. Washington knows it lacks the will to muster a military victory though the US armed forces have sustained the canard that Trump’s “policy” is producing battlefield wins. Washington has tried to convince the Taliban that they cannot win either. This is absurd and the Taliban, as well as their Pakistani patrons, know it.

The Taliban need not govern or defeat the Afghan and American-led forces. They merely need to preclude the Afghan government from exercising hegemony of violence.

Wizened observers know the Taliban have the upper hand for several reasons: they are going nowhere, they know the Americans want out at any cost, and the stakes in Afghanistan for their Pakistani dullahs are high as Kabul has forged relations with its near and far neighbours, including India, to diminish Islamabad’s coercive power.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, responding to the news from Khalilzad, said, “We are committed to ensuring peace…But there are values which are non-negotiable, for example national unity, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, a powerful and competent central government basic rights of the citizens of the country.”

In contrast, the Taliban have insisted upon an interim power-sharing agreement without contesting elections, instituting Islamic law, dispensing with much of the constitution and reversing gains in women’s rights.

The Americans seem more than willing to sell out the Afghans, despite the enormous loss of life and expenditures. Arm-chair Afghan analysts ridiculed sceptics, arguing that a commitment to keep al Qaeda from operating in Afghanistan has never been on the table.

While this is technically true, it is not that it could not have been. After the 9/11 attacks, President Pervez Musharraf dispatched his ISI chief, Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed, to persuade the Taliban to give up Osama bin Laden to a Muslim country. However, Ahmed told the Taliban to hold out. Musharraf sacked him and the Americans invaded Afghanistan on October 7. While we will never know if a different outcome could have been secured with another negotiator, we know that the Americans were never committed to resourcing this war for an ensemble of reasons that changed over time.

Defeat, most importantly, was a foregone conclusion when Washington went to war with Pakistan as its key partner. It was like hiring an arsonist to put out the fires he continually starts. Pakistan was always the centre of gravity of this conflict yet the Americans could never find a way of countenancing this reality.

With the Americans dead set to withdraw, it’s clear that Washington, once again, will serve up Afghanistan to Pakistan on a platter. With the Afghan security forces struggling and American military and financial support likely to evaporate, the government faces a serious challenge. And this is exactly the opportunity Pakistan has been waiting for.

This first appeared on Feb 01, 2019 18:35:45 IST  FIRSTPOST PRINT EDITION